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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE MAIN PARKING MALL, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION: 
SALT LAKE CITY COMMISSION 
IN ITS CAPACITY AS REDEVEL-
OPMENT AGENCY OF S A L T 
LAKE CITY; AND REDEVELOP-
MENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, 
Defendants and Respondents. J 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
13722 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant's amended complaint in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sought injunctive 
relief against the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City and others together with declaratory judgment re-
garding the Agency's tentative plans for revelopment 
of a portion of Salt Lake City's central business district. 
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DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson pre-
siding, determined that Appellant's amended complaint 
failed to state a cause of action and ordered that the 
amended complaint be dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant, Main Parking Mall, seeks reversal 
of the trial court's judgment of dismissal and an order 
remanding this case for a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT 
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAIL-
URE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION: 
A. REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY HAS AUTHORITY TO EN-
TER INTO THE "EXCLUSIVE NEGO-
TIATION" AGREEMENT WITH HART-
NETT-SHAW. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS SUB-
JECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO IN-
TERPRET THE FEDERAL LAW AND 
REGULATIONS W H I C H COMPRISE 
THRESHOLD ISSUES UNDER PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
C. PLAINTIFF IS WITHOUT STANDING 
TO SEEK DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
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3 
DETERMINING PROPER CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE "EXCLUSIVE NEGOTIA-
TION" AGREEMENT. 
D. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT 
WAS PREMATURE AND ITS ESSEN-
TIAL ALLEGATIONS ARE CONTRA-
DICTED BY THE EXHIBITS THERE-
TO. 
E. THE REMEDIES SOUGHT BY PLAIN-
TIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY 
ALLEGATIONS. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents supplement and clarify Appellant's 
statement of facts as follows: 
In accordance with part of a legally adopted plan 
for neighborhood redevelopment, the Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City (herein sometimes designated 
"Redevolpmenit Agency") acquired title to all except 
the Main Street frontage and the southwest corner of 
a city block in downtown Salt Lake City bordered by 
Main Street, West Temple, Second South and Third 
South Streets (R. 79). The property was previously held 
by a number of owners including the Appellant, Main 
Parking Mall. The redevelopment project area is desig-
nated Central Business District West (CBD West). 
The purpose of the program under which the prop-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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erty was acquired is to remove blight. After blighted 
land has been acquired and cleared by the Agency, the 
land is made available for sale to private redeveloped 
at a price not less than the value of its reuse appraisal. 
A reuse appraisal is related to a particular proposed de-
velopment and cannot be made until the nature and 
scope of the proposed development is determined. 
Primary considerations in the disposition process are: 
(1) nature, quality and design of the proposed improve-
ments, (2) financial ability of the private redeveloper 
to complete proposed improvements, and (3) demon-
strated experience or ability of the private redevelopers 
to achieve the proposed results. 
By a resolution passed on February 8, 1973, the 
Board of Commissioners of the Redevelopment Agency 
authorized the offering of the subject CBD West prop-
erty, containing approximately 6.5 acres, for preliminary 
proposals for its redevelopment (R. 77). The resolution 
declares that the competition-negotiation method without 
a bid price requirement would be used to select a rede-
veloper. During March 1973 advertisements announcing 
the offer appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune, Deseret 
News, Wall Street Journal and Business Week. Those 
who indicated interest in becoming redevelopers of the 
project were given additional details and requirements 
of the offer and were also furnished a copy of an urban 
design study of the project property which had been com-
missioned by the Redevelopment Agency (R. 80). 
The deadline for filing notices of interest was ex-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tended from May 10, 1973 to June 7, 1973. Indications 
of interest were received by the Redevelopment Agency 
from more than thirty prospective redevelopers. Five of 
those indicating interest subsequently stated their inten-
tion to submit proposals for the project, but only four 
proposals were submitted, including one by Appellant. 
On July 25, 1973, after proposals from three other 
prospective redevelopers had been received and consid-
ered, representatives of Appellant presented a proposal 
to the Agency which consisted of a preliminary architec-
tural rendering, a site plan and a statement of the re-
developer's experience Mid its interest in the project. The 
governing board of the Redevelopment Agency, in proper 
exercise of its discretion, thereupon determined that only 
one of the four proposals, (that submitted by Hartnett-
Shaw Development Company, Inc.) met the requirements 
which had been established. The Hartnett-Shaw pro-
posal was for a $40 million development containing an 
18-sitory Sheraton Hotel and a large office building. 
After the preliminary screening, further time and 
expense were required to determine feasibility and to 
explore refinements of the Hartnett-Shaw proposal. To 
justify expenditure by Hartnett-Shaw of approximately 
$100,000 for architectural work and other studies (R. 
189) and to assure that the Redevelopment Agency 
would not negotiate with other interested parties until 
there had been adequate opportunity to reach final 
agreement on numerous details or conclude that such 
final agreement was impossible, the Redevelopment 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Agency and Hartnett-Shaw entered into an "exclusive 
negotiation" agreement (R. 228-231). 
Appellant filed a complaint requesting injunctive 
and declaratory relief against Respondents on November 
9, 1973, alleging that the procedures followed by the Re-
development Agency were unfair to Appellant as a pros-
pective redeveloper. Plaintiff simultaneously obtained 
an order requiring Defendants to show cause why the 
relief sought by Plaintiff should not be summarily granted. 
Defendants objected to the order to show cause and 
moved for dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. 
At a hearing before the court on November 30, 1973 
Plaintiff consented to a vacation of the order to show 
cause and the parties spent two hours before the court 
arguing Defendants' motion to dismiss, whereupon the 
court indicated it was ready to rule. However, it granted 
Plaintiff's request for ten days within which to file a 
memorandum. Plaintiff thereafter requested and received 
a further extension of time for filing its memorandum be-
cause it wanted a transcript of the oral arguments at the 
hearing. While Judge Jeppson had Defendants' motion 
to dismiss under advisement, Plaintiff obtained from an-
other judge on January 23, 1974 (during Judge Jeppson's 
Vacation absence) an order permitting Plaintiff to take 
depositions. Plaintiff took depositions on January 31, 
1974 and March 8, 1974. 
To bring to decision its motion which had been under 
advisement since November 30, 1973, Defendants filed on 
April 26, 1974 a notice of further hearing and request 
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for ruling. At the request of Plaintiff the further hearing 
was delayed until May 17, 1974 at which time Plaintiff 
requested and was granted leave to file an amended 
complaint. Defendants immediately filed an answer to 
the amended complaint and renewed their motions for 
dismissal and summary judgment. After hearing the 
motions on May 24, 1974 the amended complaint was 
dismissed (R. 7-8). 
POINT A. 
APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT 
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY HAS AUTHORITY TO ENTER 
INTO THE "EXCLUSIVE NEGOTIATION" 
AGREEMENT WITH HARTNETT-SHAW. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City was cre-
ated pursuant to §11-19-3 Utah Code Annotated which 
provides: 
11-19-3. Designation of redevelopment 
agency—Powers and duties.— Each commun-
ity by enactment of an ordinance by its legisla-
tive body may designate the legislative body 
of the community as the redevelopment agen-
cy of such community, which agency shall be 
authorized to enter into contracts generally 
and shall have power to transact the business 
and exercise all the powers provided for in this 
act. The agency may accept financial or other 
assistance from any public or private source for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the agency's activities, powers, and duties, and 
expend any funds so received for any of the 
purposes of this act. The agency may borrow 
money or accept financial or other assistance 
from the state or the federal government for 
any redevelopment project within [its area 
of] operation and comply with any conditions 
of such loan or grant, (emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Redevelopment Agency is granted hroad 
power to enter into contracts and its permission to com-
ply with conditions of loans or grants from either state 
or federal sources is permissive rather than mandatory. 
It should be noted that throughout Appellant's brief, 
reference to the foregoing statutory section consistently 
reflects Appellant's pivotal error in its assertion that the 
permissive language concerning compliance with condi-
tions of loans or grants is somehow made mandatory 
and that such mandatory requirement somehow attains 
the status of law. 
Although this statute gives assurance to federal or 
state lenders that complaince with loan conditions will 
be authorized and permitted, it cannot reasonably be 
read to create in a third party a cause of action against 
the borrower in Utah courts. If a third party has any 
justiciable interest under such circumstances, it could 
only be against the lender for failure to enforce the con-
ditions of such loan or grant, or against the state of Utah 
for failure to permit proper compliance by the borrower. 
Not only is the language of §11-9-3 entirely permis-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sive, but the long-standing prohibition against delega-
tion of legislative prerogatives and responsibilities also 
applies to this issue. (See e.g. State v. Goss, 79 U. 559, 
11 P. 2d 340, 341-42 (1932).) While the legislature may 
permit an agency to accept funds from the federal govern-
ment subject to compliance with its proper conditions, 
to construe such contractual agreements or administra-
tive guidelines as having the status of law would offend 
the prohibition against delegation of legislative preroga-
tives. Section 11-19-3 was enacted in 1970 and the Master 
Agreements and Urban Renewal Handbook referred to 
by Appellant are all of subsequent origin. 
POINT B. 
APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT 
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE 
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION TO INTERPRET 
THE FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATIONS 
WHICH COMPRISE THRESHOLD ISSUES 
UNDER PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
One of the remedies sought by Appellant's original 
complaint and by its amended complaint (though vaguely 
worded and not couched in proper "mandatory injunc-
tion" language) is "That this court make an order re-
quiring the Defendants to follow the Rules and Regula-
tions of Master Agreements and the Urban Renewal 
Handbook in the disposition of said property" (R. 73-76). 
To grant this relief sought by Plaintiff would require 
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the trial court to construe and interpret such "Rules and 
Regulations, Master Agreements and the Urban Renewal 
Handbook" in the course of determining whether Defen-
dants were violating or threatening to violate such pro-
visions. Even if all the provisions on which Appellant 
relies were "Rules and Regulations" (which Respondents 
deny), such interpretation and construction would re-
quire the state court to go beyond its jurisdiction. Be-
cause such rules and regulations would have to be pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban De-
velopment pursuant to authority of the Housing Act of 
1949 (42 U. S. C. §1441 through 1469) their interpreta-
tion, and actions to enforce compliance therewith, would 
be reserved exclusively to the federal courts. 
In Hunter v. New York, 121 N. Y. S. 2nd 841 (Sup. 
Ot. 1944), where third party individual plaintiffs sought 
to attack activities of an urban renewal project funded 
under the Housing Act of 1949, the court dismissed the 
complaint stating: 
Assuming arguendo, plaintiffs have legal 
capacity to sue under the Act and may main-
tain the action at bar, nevertheless the com-
plaint must be dismissed for the reason that 
neither this court nor any other state court is 
the proper forum for such suit; state courts 
have no jurisdiction over the acts of federal of-
ficials acting as such in the administration of 
the federal laws or as agencies of the federal 
government. Perkins v Lukens Steel Co., 
supra (310 U.S. 113, 125 60 S. Ct. 869, 876, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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84 L. Ed 1108); Tennessee Electric Power 
Co. v Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 
118, 59 S. Ct. 366, 83 L. Ed. 543; Mount 
Hope Development Corp. v James, 258 N.Y. 
510, 180 N.E. 252; Armand Schnoll, Inc. v 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 286 N.Y. 
503, 506, 37 U.E. 2d 225, 138 A.L.R. 1187. 
(Id. at 847-48). 
See also Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment 
Agency, 395 Fed. 2d 920, 936 n. 38 (2d Cir. 1968), where 
the court said it saw Hunter as holding that state courts 
have no jurisdiction to review actions of agencies of the 
federal government. 
Even if the state courts were permitted to interpret, 
construe and enforce compliance with federal regulations, 
the lower court herein was correct in finding that the 
provisions of the Urban Renewal Handbook on winch 
Appellant relies did not have the binding force of law. 
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act declares that 
rules and regulations enacted by United States govern-
ment agencies take effect with the binding force of law 
only after noticed hearings are held and the rules or 
regulations are published in the Federal Register. See 
5 U. S. C. §§552 and 553. The provisions of the Urban 
Renewal Handbook have never been the subject of such 
hearings nor have they been published in the Federal 
Register. As a result, they do not constitute the law of 
the United States or of the State of Utah. 
P&ragraph 25 of Appellant's amended complaint 
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alleges that the "exclusive negotiation" agreement be-
tween Redevelopment Agency and Hartnett-Shaw was 
entered into "unlawfully and contrary to the Neighbor-
hood Development Program and Master Agreement. . ." 
(R. 72). While Appellant's brief states it is not "attack-
ing any of the agreements entered into between the 
U. S. Department of Housing & Urban Development 
and the Respondents" (Appellant's Brief page 14), Ap-
pellant seeks to enforce provisions of such agreement in 
the state courts — presumably on a third party benefi-
ciary theory. 
In Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of 
Oakland, California, 317 F. 2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963), cert, 
den., 375 U. S. 915, 11 Law. Ed. 2d 154, 84 Su. Ct. 216 
(1963), the Circuit Court stated with respect to an effort 
by certain individuals to challenge action by a redevelop-
ment agency under the same provisions of the Housing 
Act of 1949 upon which plaintiff herein apparently re-
lies: 
We find no indication that Congress intended 
this section of the Housing Act to give a right 
of action to those not a party to the contract 
between Redevelopment A g e n c y and the 
United States. 
More specifically, with respect to the Plaintiff's argu-
ment that they were third party beneficiaries of a con-
tract between the United States and the Redevelopment 
Agency entered into pursuant to the Housing Act of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1949, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the 
Johnson case, supra: 
The federal courts have consistently held that 
those not parties to the contract have no stand-
ing to enforce conditions imposed on redevel-
opment agencies by the United States, al-
though those suing would benefit from such 
enforcement. 
Appellant cites Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelop-
ment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920 (2d Cix. 1968); Powelton 
Civic Homeowners Association v. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, 284 Fed. Supp. 809 (D. C. Pa. 
1968); and Western Additional Community Organization 
v. Weber, 294 Fed. Supp, 433 (D. C. Cal. 1968) as case 
evidence that standing to sue under the Housing Act 
of 1949 has been expanded by congressional amendment. 
The only applicable congressional enactments are 1965 
and 1966 amendments to Section 1455(c) (2) and Sec-
tion 1455(f) of the Act which deal exclusively with the 
adequacy of replacement housing for tenants about to 
be displaced by urban renewal projects. Appellant is 
not in the position of a tenant about to be displaced, and 
thus the cited cases do not provide a basis for standing 
to bring the present action. 
POINT C. 
APPELLANT'S A M E N D E D COMPLAINT 
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF IS WITHOUT STANDING TO 
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SEEK DECLARATORY JUDGMENT DE-
TERMINING THE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE "EXCLUSIVE N E G O T I A T I O N " 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN REDEVELOP-
MENT AGENCY AND HARTNETT-SHAW. 
Another form of relief sought by Appellant in its 
complaint and amended complaint (without clearly speci-
fying that it seeks declaratory judgment pursuant to §78-
33-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated) is "That said agree-
ment between the defendant and Hartnett-S'haw Devel-
opment Company, Inc. be declared null and void" (R. 
73 through R. 76). The relief sought is a statutory rem-
edy as set forth in §78-33-2, Utah Code Annotated (1963), 
which provides that such declaratory judgment is avail-
able only to persons "whose rights, status or other legal 
relations" are affected by such a contract. In paragraph 
41 of Appellant's amended complaint it alleges that the 
"exclusive negotiation" agreement is "so ambiguous, un-
certain and in many respects unintelligible as to its terms 
that it is unenforceable and of no force and effect." Since 
there is no dispute between the parties to that agreement 
concerning its terms and provisions, and because Plain-
tiff is not a party to the contract nor directly affected 
by its terms, it lacks standing to seek the declaratory 
judgment relief prayed for. Lyon v. Bateman, 119 U. 434, 
228 P. 2d 818 (1951); Infl Broth, of Teamsters Local 
389 v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 692, 
288 P. 2d 181, 184 (1955). 
Even if Plaintiff had standing to seek a declaratory 
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judgment interpreting the provisions of the contract, the 
court was able to determine as a matter of law that its 
language was not ambiguous, uncertain or unintelligible 
and that as a matter of law it was not beyond the power 
of Redevelopment Agency to enter into the agreement. 
POINT D. 
PLAINTIFFS A M E N D E D COMPLAINT 
WAS PREMATURE AND ITS ESSENTIAL 
ALLEGATIONS ARE CONTRADICTED BY 
THE EXHIBITS THERETO. 
Assuming, arguendo, (1) that the court had juris-
diction over the subject matter, (2) that Plaintiff had 
standing to sue, and (3) that the court was able to exer-
cise its declaratory judgment powers to determine the 
validity and/or construction of the "exclusive negotia-
tion" agreement, all of the essential facts concerning 
fundamental issues before the court were embodied in 
the pleadings, supporting and opposing affidavits, and 
matters received in evidence at the two hour hearing held 
on November 30, 1973 (which transcript Appellant or-
dered shortly after the hearing but for its own reasons 
has chosen to exclude from the record on appeal herein). 
The existence and language of the "exclusive nego-
tiation" agreement was in evidence and undisputed. The 
provisions of the Urban Renewal Handbook which Ap-
pellant deemed controlling were placed before the court 
as Exhibits D and E to the original complaint. From 
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these the court was able to determine that Plaintiff's 
complaint was premature, no justiciable issue was before 
the court, and Defendants had in fact complied with the 
rules and regulations which Plaintiff asserted were bind-
ing upon it. 
Appellant has persistently taken the posture that 
the "exclusive negotiation" agreement of August 22, 1973 
(clearest copy is found at R. 228-230) is a final agree-
ment for disposition of the subject parcel notwithstand-
ing: 
1. The beginning sentence of that letter 
agreement states "The Redevelopment Agency 
of Salt Lake City, hereinafter designated as 
'Agency', hereby offers to negotiate with 
Hartnett-Shaw Development Company, Inc., 
an Illinois corporation, hereinafter referred to 
as "redeveloper" for the period of one hundred 
eighty (180) days next following the accept-
ance of this offer for the purchase and develop-
ment of the project area known as Parcel B-l, 
CBD West Neighborhood Development Pro-
gram Project." (emphasis added) 
2. Numbered paragraph 1 in the letter 
agreement states in part: "Upon the execution 
of a Redevelopment Contract between the 
Agency and the Redeveloper, the Redeveloper 
will tender to the Agency, as earnest money for 
the performance of said contract by the Re-
developer, a certified check . . .", clearly evi-
dencing the contemplation of a future contract. 
3. Numbered paragraph 2 of the subject 
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agreement states in part: "Immediately upon 
acceptance of this offer by the Redeveloper, 
the Redeveloper will designate one represent-
ative for contract negotiations and an archi-
tect for design conferences. The representative 
shall be given authority to act as a spokesman 
for the Redeveloper during the negotiations 
regarding the subject parcel . . .", clearly in-
dicating that future negotiations were con-
templated. 
4. Numbered paragraph 3 of the agree-
ment states in part: "During the negotiating 
period, the Redeveloper will submit to the 
Agency periodic reports as to the progress of 
the development, design and other activi-
ties . . ." 
5. Numbered paragraph 4 states in part: 
"The purchase price of the subject property 
shall be determined by negotiation . . ." 
6. Numbered paragraph 8 states in part 
"The right to negotiate for the purchase and 
development of the subject property shall be 
exclusive in the Redeveloper for the duration 
of the one hundred eighty (180) day period 
next following the acceptance by the Rede-
veloper." 
7. Numbered paragraph 9 states in part 
"In the event that negotiations do not culmin-
ate in an executed agreement to purchase and 
develop the parcel B-l, the Redeveloper will 
submit to the Agency its findings and de-
terminations regarding the proposed develop-
ments and copies of all studies and reports 
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made by it . . .", clearly indicating that both 
parties contemplated certain procedures if a 
final contract is not entered into. 
Appellant complains that in offering the property 
for redevelopment, the Redevelopment Agency improp-
erly deleted the bid price requirement under the com-
petition-negotiation selection method and points to lan-
guage on page 1 of Exhibit E to its original complaint 
(R.219) that the Redevelopment Agency "must accept 
the highest bid received from the bidders who meet the 
bidding requirements, provided the bid equals or exceeds 
the approved minimum price." (Emphasis added.) The 
court also had before it the next sentences which state 
"This does not preclude the establishment of criteria, 
such as design standards, . . . necessary to qualify a 
bidder for final selection. A two-stage offering in which 
proposals are selected on the basis of factors other than 
price, to compete at a later date on the basis of price, 
is acceptable." 
Even under the acompetition-negotiation,, method, 
the provisions of the Urban Renewal Handbook (R. 213) 
provide: 
C O M P E T I T I O N - N E G O T I A T I O N 
COMBINATION The availability of the 
land is made known by public announcement, 
but selection is made after negoation with one 
or more redevelopers whose initial proposals 
have been determined to be most acceptable. 
A public hearing on the proposal is required 
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prior to execution of the contract, (emphasis 
added) 
These provisions are further amplified on page 6 of 
Exhibit E to Appellant's original complaint (R. 224) in 
which the first statement under the heading "(2) Com-
petition-Negotiation Ck>mbimtion" says: 
The two steps in this method, public offer-
ing and the selection by negotiation, are de-
signed to assure opportunity to all potential 
redevelopers to submit proposals and to give 
the L P A [local public agency or, in this case 
the Redevelopment Agency] flexibility in 
making its selection/' (emphasis added) 
The data sheet furnished by the Redevelopment 
Agency to potential redevelopers, copy of which was 
attached to Appellant's original compkinit as Exhibit A 
(R. 209), includes the statement: "The Redevelopment 
Agency reserves the right to reject any or all proposals 
. . ." Such a right is specifically permitted by the Urban 
Renewal Handbook (R. 214). 
It is to be observed that nowhere in Plaintiffs 
amended complaint is there an allegation that the gov-
erning body of the Redevelopment Agency abused its 
discretion. It is clear that Appellant has chosen to read 
only selected sections of the handbook rules upon which 
it relies, without giving proper consideration to those 
other sections which show that the Redevelopment 
Agency has proceeded properly to this point. However, 
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the trial court was not prevented from reading the entire 
content of exhibits attached to Appellant's complaint, 
rather than merely those isolated sections which Appel-
lant chose to emphasize. In viewing the whole amended 
complaint, including exhibits which Plaintiff had placed 
before the court, the court was justified in reaching the 
compelling decision that the amended complaint feiiled 
to state a cause of action. 
POINT E. 
THE REMEDIES SOUGHT BY PLAIN-
TIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY ALLEGA-
TIONS. 
The injunctive relief sought by Appellant's amended 
complaint ("The Defendants be enjoined from further 
negotiations with Hartnett-Shaw Development Company, 
Inc." R. 73 and 75.) was not supported by allegations 
that (1) Plaintiffs remedies at law are inadequate, (2) 
Plaintiff would suffer irreparable damage, or (3) that 
final action by the Revelopment Agency in disposing of 
the property was so imminent that invokng the injunc-
tive powers of the court was necessary to prevent some 
irreversible action. In the absence of such allegations or 
ones of similar import, no cause of action for injunctive 
relief may be maintained. Rule 65A(e), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
On the contrary, the affidavit of Honorable E. J. 
Gam, Mayor of Salt Lake City (R. 188) stated: "If 
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present negotiations [between Redevelopment Agency 
and Hartnett-Shaw] result in proposals mutually agree-
able in all of their terms, then a public hearing will be 
scheduled to assure full cxmsideration of all relevant as-
pects prior to executing a final agreement with Hartnett-
Shaw or any other proposed developer." Such affidavit 
was not opposed by Appellant, and indeed that state-
ment was reaffirmed in the subsequent deposition testi-
mony of Mayor Gam in this action. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant had full opportunity to present its proposal 
for redevelopment of a parcel of land available for that 
purpose. The proposal was considered and rejected in 
favor of a competing proposal which, in the proper exer-
cise of the discretion of the City Commissioners of Salt 
Lake City, sitting as the governing board of the Rede-
velopment Agency of Salt Lake City, was deemed superior. 
Appellant's claims that Defendants have failed to 
comply with federal agency regulations, even if such 
claims were valid, could be brought only in the federal 
court. Appellant lacks standing to obtain a declaratory 
judgment concerning a contract to which it is not a party 
and in which it has no direct interest. 
Appellant's complaint lacked allegations of inade-
quacy of remedies at law, irreparable injury, and the 
imminance of any threatened action, all of which are 
essential pleadings for the injunctive relief sought. 
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Looking at the entire complaint, including all ex-
hibits thereto, the trial court could and properly did 
find that Appellant's amended complaint had failed to 
state a cause of action supporting the relief sought. The 
ruling of the lower court should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX 
By: B. Lloyd Poelman 
Stephen G. Stoker 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
DEC 6 1975 
BRiG'IAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
